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upholds an agreement to lease land which, on its face, has the possi-
bility of not vesting during the prescribed time should be made only
after careful consideration.
JAMES L. HowE, III
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN ACCESSORY BEFORE THE
FACT AND PRINCIPAL
"The ancient doctrine that 'no accessory can be convicted or suffer
any punishment where the principal is not attainted or hath the bene-
fit of his clergy' led to the escape of many offenders. On the other
hand it served in certain cases to mitigate the ferocity of the ancient
law in the punishment of felons."' Whereas the common law denied a
merger of the crimes of accessory before the fact and principal, mod-
ern statutes have removed this distinction from the criminal law.
Justice was often thwarted by .the older rule and a desire for re-
form brought about statutory modification in England. Two English
statutes, in 1826 and 1848 were designed to change this outmoded
rule.2 The 1848 statute was reenacted with unimportant changes in
1861 and this statute remains in effect today.3 The statute of 1826
authorized conviction of a separate substantive offense, 4 but it was in-
terpreted to mean "not to make those triable who before could never
have been tried." The real reform came in 1848 when the statute
allowed an accessory to be indicted, tried and convicted as a principal
felon. 6 The modern practice is to make the accessory before the fact
triable independently of the principal7 and to "provide that the prior
conviction of the principal is not a pre-condition of the prosecution
of an accessory before the fact."s
The New York court in People v. Bliven0 speaking of the common
law immunity of the accessory when the principal was not tried or
'Russell, Crime 164-5 (iith ed. 1958).
-Criminal Justice Act, 1826, 7 Geo. 4, c. 64; Criminal Justice Act, 1848, 11 & 12
Vict., C. 46.
3Accessories and Abbettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94. A check of this statute
to 1961 shows it to be still in effect.
'7 Geo. 4, c. 64.
rRex v. Russell, i Moody 356, 368, 168 Eng. Rep. 1302, 13o6 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1832).
624 & 25 Vict., c. 94.
-See, e.g., Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-102 (1956); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21-105 (1949);
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 556.170 (1959); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 41-6-34 (1953); Vt. Stat. tit. 41,
ch. 375 (i947)-
'Model Penal Code, appendix 41 (Tent. Draft, No. 1 1953).
"112 N.Y. 79, 19 N.E. 638 (1889).
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not amenable to prosecution asserted: "The general policy through-
out this country and England runs in favor of more liberal views at
the present time in regard to the treatment of those technicalities
which formerly existed as obstructions in the path of the enforce-
ment of the criminal law."'10
Modern statutes relating to accessories before the fact are based
on two theoretical grounds. Some allow conviction of a separate sub-
stantive offense," while others allow conviction as principal upon evi-
dence showing the defendant to be an accessory.' 2 Some jurisdictions
do not permit conviction of the accessory when the principal has been
acquitted;" others allow this procedure on the theory that the second
jury, not being bound by the decision of the first, has been convinced
of the guilt of the principal offender.'
4
The problem of the accessory-principal relationship was raised in
the recent North Carolina decision of State v. Jonesr5 in which Jones
was convicted of murder in the first degree on the evidence of three
accomplices. There was evidence that the defendant was an accessory
before the fact, but-the trial court refused to instruct the jury on this
point. The supreme court in the opinion of Chief Justice Winborne,
with three judges dissenting, held that the crime of accessory before the
fact is a lesser included offense, reversed the conviction for the failure
to so instruct the jury, and ordered a new trial.
Two of the dissenting justices felt that the evidence failed to show
that the defendant could have been an accessory before the fact and
would have affirmed the judgment; they further disagreed with the
majority that an accessory before the fact is a lesser included offense.16
'lI9 N.E. at 644.
"Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 102 (1953); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 274, § 3 (1956); Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 939.05 (1959). For an excellent discussion of accessory before the fact as
a separate substantive offense see Schwartz v. State, 37 Del. 4841, 185 At. 233 (1936);
12Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.011 (Supp. 196o); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5105 ('945);
Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 80-82 (1948). For a discussion of this principle see Burnett
V. People, 20 4 Il1. 208, 68 N.E. 5o, 51o (s9o3).
'3Murphy v. State, 184 Ind. 15, iio N.E. 198 (1915); State v. Jones, 101 N.C. 719,
S.E. 1-7, 148 (1888); Maybush v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. (29 Gratt.) 857 (1878).
"Commonwealth v. DiStasio, 297 Mass. 347, 8 N.E.2d 923, 929 (1937); Fleming
v. State, 142 Miss. 872, o8 So. 143, 145 (1926); Thomas v. State, 40 Okla. 204, 267
Pac. 1040, 1043 (1928).
The California statute says: "An accessory to the commission of a felony may be
prosecuted tried and punished, though the principal may be neither prosecuted nor
tried, and though the principal may have been acquitted." Cal. Pen. Code § 972.
2'-54 N.C. 450, 119 S.E.2d 213 (ig6i).
-"State %. Simons, 179 N.C. 700, 103 S.E. 5 (192o). Precedent in North Carolina
that accessory before the fact is a lesser included offense is based on the case of
State v. Bryson, 173 N.C. 8o3, 92 S.E. 698 (917). The decision in Bryson appears to
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Another dissenting justice felt the problem of accessory in any degree
did not arise.
State v. Jones raises the basic problem once again, i.e., whether
an indictment for the principal crime gives notice to the defendant
that he may be convicted as an accessory. Specifically, is the right to
be informed of the charge violated by indictment as a principal and
conviction as an accessory? The corollary and less disputable problem
of whether an accessory may be indicted, tried and convicted before
the principal has been practically legislated out of existence.
17
The common law did not authorize conviction as accessory before
the fact when the indictment was as a principal in the commission of
the crime.ls State v. Buzzell19 from New Hampshire clearly states this
doctrine: "In murder, the felony of an accessory is not the act of a
principal; and the felony of a principal is not the act of an accessory.
In fact they are different acts, done at different times and different
places: in law, they are different crimes." 20 Here, summarized, is the
traditional view holding the two crimes, accessory before the fact and
principal, separate and distinct and by implication requiring separate
indictments.
This traditional position of -the common law has been modified to-
day for the most part.21 "The general rule now is that one who at
common law would be an accessory before the fact may be charged
directly in the indictment with the commission of the offense, or he
may be charged as principal by setting out facts which at common law
would constitute him such accessory."
22
The question of a right to be informed of the nature of the crime
have been reached more on expediency than reason, and it would have been bctter
if the court had reconsidered this problem in the present case.
'"In the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree and every
accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted, and punished in all re-
spects as if a principal in 'the first degree...." Va. Code Ann. § i8.-ii (Repl. Vol.
ig6o). See also, S.C. Code § 16-2 (1952); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-io9 (1955); W. Va.
Code § 6119 (g55).
"s"At common law an accessory before the fact could not, in felonies, be tried
and convicted as such upon an indictment charging as principal...." State v.
Levine, 117 Vt. 320, 91 A.2d 678, 680 (1952).
"At common law an accessory before the fact to a felony was deemed to have
committed a crime separate and distinct from that committed by the principal,
and could not be convicted of the latter or main offense merely because of his con-
nection therewith as accessory .... Accordingly, one who seas a mere accessory could
be convicted only upon an indictment charging him as such...." Chambers v. State,
194 Ga. 773, 22 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1942).
1158 N.H. 257 (1878).
21Id. at 258.
2See notes 26 and 27 infra.
-4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 1791 (l2th ed. 1957).
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charged in relation to the accessory-principal problem is shown in two
of the leading cases on the point, State v. Whitman23 from Minnesota
and People v. Bliven 24 from New York. Both these cases were decided
under statutes which allow conviction as a principal when the evi-
dence shows the defendant to be an accessory before the fact.25 The
statutes abolish the distinction between principal and accessory recog-
nized by the common law. There is also a constitutional question,
whether under such statutes the defendant is sufficiently informed of
the charge against him. Speaking directly on the constitutional prob-
lem involved, the Minnesota court said:
"(O]ne who at common law would be an accessory before the
fact may be charged directly by the indictment with the com-
mission of the felony as principal, and on his trial evidence
may be received to show that he procured the crime to be com-
mitted, and further that the reception of such evidence is
neither a variance nor a violation of section 6, art. 1 of our
Constitution providing that in criminal cases the accused shall
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
2 -0
The view adopted in Minnesota is a major reformation in the acces-
sory-principal relationship, recognizing that sufficient notice to satisfy
the constitution is given to the accessory when he is indicted as a prin-
cipal and convicted on evidence that he was an accessory before the
fact.
Statutory revision and judicial interpretation have changed the
common law theory which separated principal and accessory before
the fact. Modern criminal law exhibits a strong tendency to merge
the two crimes. In People v. Bliven, the court said of this traditional
distinction:
"The only objection that could be urged against an indictment
in this form is the possibility of misleading -the defendant as
to the nature or character of the act of which he is accused....
[U]pon reflection we think the objection is more fanciful than
real, and if it be understood that upon an indictment of this
nature a man may be convicted upon proof, not only of his
doing the act with his own hand, but upon proof that he ad-
vised and procured another to do it, and thus did it himself,
31o3 Minn. 92, 114 N.W. 363 (1908).
-i12 N.Y. 79, ig N.E. 638 (1889).
"Minn. Stat Ann. § 610.12 (1947); N.Y. Pen. Laws § 1934 (1940).
-State '. Whitman, io3 Minn. 92, 14 N.W. 363, 364 (19o8); accord, Hunter v.
State, 47 Ariz. 244, 55 P.2d 31o, 311 (1936); State v. Olson, 40 Wash. 2d 621, 314 P.2d
.165, .168 (1957); Berry v. State, 51 Wyo. 249, 65 P.2d 1097, 1o (1937).
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we think no man will suffer any real inconvenience or any in-
justice from such a rule."27
This decision and the -view it takes of the New York statute2 l serve
to clarify the problem in that state. A defendant is put on notice that
an indictment for murder includes not only the principal crime, but
the crime of accessory before the fact as well. This informs the offender
that on an indictment for murder he may be convitced as an accessory
before the fact and establishes a sound precedent in New York.
The basis of this logic seems to rest in the tort concept of prin-
cipal and agent. As the Arizona court commented in Hunter v. State:29
"[W]lat one does acting through another he himself does, and that
the principal in the crime is the active agent of those advising, aiding
or encouraging him to do the act. An allegation in a pleading that a
person did a certain thing is sustained by proof that his agent did it.".30
This presents a more logical result than allowing an accessory before
the fact to escape when in fact his may be the main responsibility for
the crime. This reasoning appears to have been the basis for the ruling
in People v. Bliven, and the rule there as well as in State v. Whitmnan
is submitted as the preferable treatment of the problem.
The modem trend in statutory criminal law is toward merger of
all degrees in crime, including the crime of accessory before the fact.
The North Carolina statute makes the crime of accessory before the
fact a separate substantive offense.3' North Carolina is peculiar in this
field in that the punishment for an accessory before the fact may
only be life imprisonment,32 while other states allow the maximum
penalty, as the accessory is punished in the same manner as the
principal.33 In State v. Jones the premise is established that North
Carolina will not convict as a principal on evidence which shows the
defendant is an accessory before the fact. Upon indictment for the
principal offense a conviction of accessory before the fact may be had,
but not a conviction a's a principal when the evidence shows accessory
before the fact. This distinction seems to demonstrate that North Caro-
lina does not follow the theory of merger of accessory before the fact
mPeople v. Bliven, 112 N.Y. 79, 19 N.E. 638, 644 (1889). See also, Von Patzoll
v. United States, 163 F.2d 216, 219 (ioth Cir. 1947); Scott v. State, 49 Del. 2.51, 113
A.2d 880, 882 (1955); Chambers v. State, 194 Ga. 773, 22 S.E.2d 487, 489 (1942).
2N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 275 and 284.
2'47 Ariz. 244, 55 P.2d 310 (1936). For a general discussion on this point see i
Bishop, Criminal Law § 673.2 (9th ed. 1923).
"'55 P.2d at 310.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-5 (1951).
eN.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-6 (1951).
3Va. Code Ann. § 18.1- (Rep'l. Vol. 196o). This is a typical statute on pun-
ishment.
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and principal, other than the statutory innovation providing for in-
dictment, trial and conviction of an accessory before that of the prin-
cipal. The North Carolina rule also denies conviction of the accessory
after acquittal of the principal 34 in contrast with the practice in some
jurisdictions.
.
The harshness of the common law in dealing with all of the parties
to a crime was mitigated by distinguishing between accessory before
the fact and principal. This distinction is almost defunct today, made
so primarily by statute. There is still disagreement in the interpreta-
tion of various statutes and the following provisions embodied in a
statute would remove remaining areas of doubt:
i. An accessory before the fact may be indicted, tried, convicted,
and punished as a principal whether or not the principal has
been apprehended or is amenable to justice.
2. Prior acquittal of the principal will not prevent indictment,
trial, conviction, and punishment of the accessory before the
fact if his guilt can be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Upon the trial of the accessory before the fact it must be shown
that the crime was committed by a specific principal, though he
need not be named, and that the defendant either counseled,
advised, or procured the principal to do the act.
,. All parties to a felony are principals, for the crime which
one commits through the agency of another he is deemed to
have himself committed. A party is the person who actually
does 'the act; or anyone present, aiding, and abetting in the
commission of the offense; or one not present who has advised,
counseled, or procured the commission of the crime.
4. Any person indicted as a principal has notice that the in-
dictment includes the charge of accessory before the fact, under
which indictment the defendant may be convicted as a principal.
The last provision would satisfy the requirements of notice to
the defendant and serve to remove an archaic technical distinction
from modern law. Justice is best served when the guilty are punished
and outmoded obstructions are removed to allow conviction of the
accessory before the fact when his guilt can be established.
JOHN H. TATE, JR.
-tState v. Jones, ioi N.C. 719, 8 S.E. 147, 148 (1888).
• State v. Hess, 233 Wis. 4, 288 N.W. 275, 277 (1939).
